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PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION REPORT



# OMSK ICBM COMPLEX USSR

TCS-20151/68
MARCH 1968
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#### **PREFACE**

This report supersedes TCS-80406/66, Om	sk ICBM Complex, USSR, $1$ / the ini-
tial report in a series prepared in response	e to CIA Requirements C-DI5-82,972
and C-DI7-84,251 requesting detailed line drawings, to scale, of elements of the	
complex. The information contained herein is based on KEYHOLE photography	
	Individual reports will be updated
periodically to reflect changes observed on subsequent photography.	

## SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS

This report provides a brief history of the Omsk ICBM Complex, USSR. Origins, environmental characteristics of the surrounding locale, and a general background analysis of original plans and present problems are defined from information obtained during the years since the complex was first observed. The future role of the complex and its place in the overall ICBM deployment pattern are also discussed.

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


FIGURE 1. LOCATION OF OMSK ICBM COMPLEX.

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### OMSK ICBM COMPLEX, USSR

The Omsk ICBM Complex (Figure 1) is in the Steppe Region of Western Siberia northeast of the city of Omsk, a major transportation and industrial center and the capital of the Omsk Oblast in the Russian SFSR. The city is on the east bank of the Irtysh river at the confluence of the Om river. The Trans-Siberian Railroad crosses the Irtysh near the south side of the city; the junction of railroads from Tyumen and Chelyabinsk is on the west bank.

This is the smallest complex deployed in the Soviet Union. It consists of a complex support facility, a rail-to-road transfer point, and 1 Type IIIB launch site. Construction for a second site was started, but abandoned while still in an early stage. The complex support facility is slightly over 6.0 nm northeast of the city, and the launch site extends an additional 6.5 nm beyond it.

The complex is situated roughly in the center of the West Siberian Plain, a vast flat area drained by the Irtysh and Ob rivers. Elevations at the complex range between 350 to 400 feet, with very slight variations within the individual facilities. The complex lies north of the Om river and east of the Irtysh. Drainage is generally toward these 2 rivers, but the terrain is too flat to produce a distinguishable pattern. Poor drainage is probably the reason for several large open excavations in the vicinity of the separate facilities. These are probably sumps to provide for water runoff during heavy rains. Clumps of trees, mostly evergreens, cover from 40 to 50 percent of the terrain. Agriculture accounts for most of the open land, and the numerous small towns and villages in the general area all maintain their individual cultivated plots.

The Steppe Region is the warmest part of Western Siberia. Snow cover is normally limited to the period from early November to mid-April. The average temperature in January is close to 0° F. Summers are quite warm and temperatures vary little. The average temperature in July is about 68° F. The region has an overall annual cloud cover average of about 60 percent. A substantial seasonal variation exists, with averages reaching a minimum in February and March and a less definite minimum again in July and August. During these periods of minimum cloudiness about one-third to one-half the days are clear. Maximum cloudiness occurs from October through December when one-fourth or less of the days are clear. During the summer months this region is occasionally subject to short periods of heavy rainfall severe enough to cause local flooding.

A spur from the Trans-Siberian Railroad serves the complex support facility and continues beyond it about 2.0 nm to terminate at the rail-to-road transfer point. An all-weather road runs from the city of Omsk to the complex support facility. Towns and villages in the general area are joined by a network of

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local roads but no cross-country highways exist. The complex support facility, rail-to-road transfer point, and launch site are all joined by a well-engineered road that was constructed concurrent with the complex facilities. First evidence of the complex was in when the complex support facility was observed. Lack of prior photography precludes a negation date; indicates that it probably was however, status of construction in Launch Site 1 was identified in an early stage of started about a new road was Subsequently, construction in observed under construction to the northwest and an excavation for a second launch site was identified about 3.5 nm northwest of Launch Site 1. This launch site never progressed beyond the excavation stage. Launch Site 1 was and, to date, is the only launch site in observed to be complete in the complex. Since completion of the launch site, there has always been a steady level of activity at the complex. Construction work, such as additional buildings in the site support facility and expansion of the transfer point, has been apparent. shows numerous missile-associated vehicles parked Photography of in the transfer point, and at the complex support facility numerous objects which appear to be preformed roof trusses are apparent outside of one of the large buildings in the railhead and storage area. Whether or not production at this building is related in any way to the missile complex has not been determined. At present there is no apparent expansion of the complex facilities. It is obvious that the original plans for this complex called for deployment of more than one launch site. In addition to the second launch site which was started and then abandoned, there was also a survey and some construction on the complex main road that indicated an intention to expand to the northnortheast and to the east. The abandonment of site construction apparently This coincides with the took place in the late summer or early abandonment of several other SS-8 launch sites at other complexes, including 2 at Gladkaya that were dropped in favor of the SS-7 missile system. Geologic conditions may also have had some effect on additional deployment at this complex. The flat terrain, poor drainage, and reportedly high water table would very likely increase the problems of silo construction. The future role of this complex is undetermined. From an economic standpoint it should have been phased out several years ago. It hardly seems feasible to maintain a complex support facility and rail-to-road transfer point to support a single launch site. The fact that the Soviets have continued to main-

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tain this complex with its one launch site gives credence to the idea that the existing facilities may be used to support the deployment of a follow-on missile

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#### REFERENCES

DOCUMENTS

NPIC. TCS-80406/66, Omsk ICBM Complex USSR, Jun 66 (TOP SECRET RUFF)

MAPS OR CHARTS

SAC. USATC, Series 200, sheet 163-10IIL, 2d cd. Sep 62 (SECRET)

REQUIREMENT

CIA. C-DI5-82,972

NPIC PROJECT

11210/66 (partial answer)

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